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Abstract

In this diploma thesis, the combined problem of power company selection and Demand Response Management in a Smart Grid Network consisting of multiple power
companies and multiple customers is studied via adopting a distributed learning and
game-theoretic technique. Each power company is characterized by its reputation
and competitiveness. The customers who act as learning automata select the most
appropriate power company to be served, in terms of price and electricity needs’
fulfillment, via a distributed learning based mechanism. Given customers’ power
company selection, the Demand Response Management problem is formulated as a
two-stage game theoretic optimization framework, where at the first stage the optimal customers’ electricity consumption is determined and at the second stage the
optimal power companies’ pricing is calculated. The output of the Demand Response
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Management problem feeds the learning system in order to build knowledge and conclude to the optimal power company selection. A two-stage Power Company learning
selection and Demand Response Management (PC-DRM) iterative algorithm is proposed in order to realize the distributed learning power company selection and the
two-stage distributed Demand Response Management framework. The performance
of the proposed approach is evaluated via modeling and simulation and its superiority
against other state of the art approaches is illustrated.
This work has been published in:
P.A. Apostolopoulos, E.E. Tsiropoulou and S. Papavassiliou: Demand
Response Management in Smart Grid Networks: A Two-Stage GameTheoretic Learning-based Approach in Mobile Networks and Applications, Springer, 2018.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

1.1

Smart Grid Networks and Related Work

It is a fact that nowadays there is a revolution in the energy distribution networks.
The growing number of users and their demands, as well as the ever-increasing competitive environment in which electricity providers are called upon to coexist, testify
that new smart distribution networks need to be studied and developed. The existing network is therefore under great pressure from the various challenges and needs
arising from the environment, consumers, market and infrastructure issues. These
challenges and needs are more important and urgent than ever, and have led the
network to expand and enhance its functions to smarter features with the help of
fast-growing technologies. The shift in the development of transmission networks to
be smarter has been briefly defined as ”Smart Network”. Some of the key goals of
these new smart energy distribution networks are to optimally serve the needs of
consumers as well as the healthy profitability of electricity companies [1].
The term ”Smart Network” has been in use since the end of 2003 and the first
appearance of the term dates back much earlier. There are several definitions of
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the ”Smart Network” that focus on either its operation or its technology. The common point of all, is the application of digital processing and communications to the
electricity grid, with data flow and management being done by a centralized system
called ”Smart Grid” [2].

The idea of a smart grid is an electricity grid that can intelligently integrate the
actions of all users connected to it, generators or consumers, in order to provide
efficient, economical and secure electricity supply. A smart network, uses innovative
products and services, combined with intelligent monitoring of the network status [3].

The Smart Network connects supply and demand by enabling both producers and
consumers to set their operating needs more flexible and sophisticated. For example,
consumers are only able to consume at high prices for extremely important reasons
and to shape their consumption according to the information they have about the
present consumption price. On the other hand, producers with high flexibility can
adjust their sales price to maximize their profits, while at the same time depending on
their electricity generation costs, they can offer consumers discount periods, thereby
expanding their advertising influence and gaining more users.

Coupled with the smart grid features offered, the liberalization of the electricity
market that began last decade, or even earlier, especially in the United States of
America, has led to the increasing establishment of smart grids. Consumers now
have the option of choosing the company from which they purchase electricity. In
Massachusetts, the electricity market was liberalized in 1997 [4], in Maryland in 1999
and in Texas in 2002 [5]. The liberalization of the electricity market forces to create
a more effective, flexible and reliable electricity system.
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1.2

Utility Theory and Related Work

The utility functions have been widely used in recent literature to model various
resource allocation problems and to reflect the consumers’ satisfaction. Single variable resource allocation problems have been studied using game theory, where utility
maximizers players coexist and compete [6–13], as well as multi variable resource allocation problems requiring a different mathematical approach [14–19]. In addition,
utility functions have been used to model complex and multilevel network structures,
as in the case of smart networks as discussed in the following chapters [20–25]. Moreover, the resources of a network to be shared with consumers may differ in their nature and properties, for example, continuous and discrete resources. For this reason,
appropriate models have been proposed in the literature, so that the utility functions
are related to the characteristics of the network resources and to the satisfaction of
the consumers [26, 27]. Utility functions have been used to even model consumer
behavior and visualize the psychological parameters that characterize them [28].
Based on the above analysis, it is concluded that utility functions are a way of
showing the degree of satisfaction of both consumers and electricity companies. From
the consumers’ point of view, the degree of satisfaction is related to the perceived
quality of service that the consumers receive compared to what is required, while in
the case of electricity companies, the utility function represents the satisfaction of
the companies with respect to the profit that a company perceives by using a specific
electricity pricing policy. The utility functions were first introduced from the study
of financial systems, but because of their widespread use and effectiveness, they are
now widely used as a robust mathematical tool, and they have been applied in many
research fields.
In [29] the implementation of utility functions helps meet challenges in business
management and development, system and software security, while in [30] utility
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functions are used for risk analysis and for describing the rate of investment in
financial models based on multiple stochastic processes.
Completely different use of the utility functions is made in [31], where their
effectiveness is used for identification purposes, as from a set of classifiers, a selection
of the most appropriate one happens according to the value of their utility functions,
so that they can be used for dealing with the difficulties of identifying faces in large
volumes of data and in low resolution images.
In addition, one of the most important issues in the world of the electricity market
is cyber security and how the national electricity infrastructure can be protected by
ensuring the privacy of users. The use of utility functions in relevant remarkable
research [32], indicates the importance of the role of utility functions in this area. A
similar implementation of utility functions is achieved in [33], in which appropriate
utility functions are designed for the purposes of secure use of cloud computing
resources.
Finally, it is quite important the use of utility functions for designing robust,
functional, and secure systems [34]. Utility functions for these purposes are used
in [35], where they are combined with economical expressions to design robust systems for Wireless Personal Area Network (WPAN) devices in accordance with IEEE
802.15.4.

1.3

Motivation

The need to develop new smart energy distribution networks to meet all the growing
demands has become an urgent need in modern society. The customers’ demands
are now directly linked to smart electricity distribution networks, where the use of
utility functions and the demand response management with new theoretical models,
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demonstrate a vital role.
In such smart grids the characteristics of the Demand Response Management
(DRM), Network Economics (NE), and electricity company choice, shape the market [36]. The theory of Network Economics aims to determine the price of electricity,
in order a successful penetration on the electricity market to be achieved [37]. The
process of selecting electricity companies aims to bridge the gap between the electricity companies and the customers, while at the same time enables consumers to make
the best choice in terms of saving money, and the companies to meet the electricity
demands of the network [38].
In [39], the problem of managing the demand response is dealt with only the
customers’ point of view, as the authors study the problem of the load control by
applying a distributed energy consumption planning to customers and a dynamic
pricing strategy to companies. Real-time power planning is calculated by adopting
a Stackelberg game model, where the power company is the leader, setting realtime price and customers planning their devices’ electricity consumption. A similar
approach is discussed in [40]. The problem of load balancing and peaks avoidance
is studied in [41], where an incentive-based algorithm for home load management is
proposed, reducing overall energy costs and taking into account the satisfaction of
the users. Also, aiming at load balancing, the authors in [42] propose an optimal
game pricing strategy for smart grid networks, by optimizing the value per day time
period, so that the electricity load of the network remains in an equilibrium state
rather than in peak values.
The home demand response management problem is studied in [43], taking into
account the underlying power distribution network and the associated constraints.
The Demand Response Management problem is formulated as a flow power problem,
and a distributed algorithm is proposed to determine the optimal demand planning,
while allowing communications between the electricity supplier and the households.
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The direct interaction between the electricity company and the customer is studied
in [44], where the problem of allocating a certain amount of load adjustment by the
electricity company to the customers is examined, with the aim of minimizing the
total loss of the consumer.
In [45], the authors study the interaction between an energy provider and multiple
customers through a Stackelberg game approach, and propose an algorithm that aims
to control the loads of the users’ devices. A similar approach is being studied in [46]
and [47], involving multiple electricity companies and multiple customers, where the
aim of the Stackelberg game is to maximize the revenue of each electricity company
and minimize the amount of payment that each customer makes.

1.4

Contributions

In this thesis, we jointly study the combined problem of optimal power company
selection by the customers based on a reputation and competitiveness distributed
learning framework, and the problem of demand response management based on a
game theoretic approach. We assume the existence of an open electricity market,
and we formulate it as a Smart Grid Network, which consists of multiple power
companies and customers. Each power company is associated with a reputation
and competitiveness factor per timeslot, while the customers adopt the stochastic
learning automata methodology [48–50] in order to select the power company that
they will served from. The learning power company selection algorithm runs once at
the beginning of each timeslot. To fully capture the interaction between the power
companies and the customers in the Smart Grid Network, the demand response management problem is modeled as a two-stage non-cooperative game. At the first stage,
the customers by considering the companies’ pricing policies, determine their optimal
electricity consumption that maximizes their utility, while at the second stage, given
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the optimal customers’ consumption, the power companies evaluate their optimal
pricing policies that maximize their profit. Moreover, in our work the non-shiftable
and shiftable customers’ demands are treated with different priority. Following the
proposed two-stage non-cooperative game theoretic approach, the customers and the
power companies can interact and finally reach the Nash Equilibrium point, if proper
strategies are selected on both sides. It is noted also, that the demand response management optimization problem consists of multiple iterations at the beginning of each
timeslot, thus it is of different time scale compared to the distributed learning power
company selection algorithm.
The following specific contributions and innovations of this paper are described
in detail, in order to achieve the aforementioned key objective.

1. A distributed learning framework is proposed towards implementing the customers’ power company selection at the beginning of each timeslot. The selection probabilities of each customer are updated by considering power companies’ reputation and competitiveness factor. The reputation and competitiveness factor of each power company reflects the provided discount, its achievable
peak-to-average ratio, and its penetration to the electricity market.
2. Representative power companies’ and customers’ profit and utility functions,
respectively, are introduced to capture their behavior within the electricity
market. Specifically, power companies’ profit function reflects the tradeoff between company’s revenue and its corresponding electricity generation cost. On
the other hand, each customer’s utility function reflects the tradeoff between
the satisfaction of its electricity demands and its corresponding total cost based
on a fair pricing policy by considering the electricity consumption of the rest
of the customers in the Smart Grid Network.
3. Following the distributed learning based power company selection process by
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the customers, the optimization problem of maximizing customers’ utility function and power companies’ profit function, is formulated as a two-stage game.
The Nash Equilibrium point of the two-stage game is achieved based on the
selection of appropriate strategies from the customers and power companies,
while a distributed algorithm that obtains the aforementioned equilibrium
point, is proposed .
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. In Section 2.1 the Demand Response
Management problem and its related work in the literature are provided, while in
Section 2.2 the Smart Grid Network is presented. Specifically, in Sections 2.2.1,
and 2.2.2 the characteristics of the customers and power companies are presented.
Furthermore, in Section 2.3 the Smart Grid Network is formulated as a learning
system and the proposed power company selection process based on the stochastic
learning automata methodology, is described. In Chapter 3 the Demand Response
Management problem is formulated as a two-stage non-cooperative game among
the customers and the power companies, and the customers’ optimal consumption
response and power companies’ optimal pricing policy, are determined. In Chapter
4, the Power Company selection and Demand Response Management (PC-DRM) is
presented, while detailed numerical and comparative performance evaluation results
of the proposed PC-DRM framework are provided in Chapter 5. Finally, Chapter 6
indicates our future work and concludes the thesis.
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Chapter 2
Description of the Demand
Response Management Problem DRM

2.1

Demand Response Management and Related
Work

With the increasingly demanding challenges of the growing electricity needs, aging
infrastructure and the integration of renewable green energy resources, a new way
of addressing these demands will need to be developed by electricity distribution
networks. As we have already mentioned, new smart electricity distribution networks
face these challenges by managing the concept of demand response. Essentially, the
demand response management refers to the implementation of techniques to control
energy consumption by consumers, improve energy efficiency and reduce the cost of
electricity generation from electricity companies [51–54]. One of the key objectives
of demand response management is to reduce the differences between electricity
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consumption and average consumption in the network so that there is a balance
between demand and supply [55].
Modeling the problem of managing the demand response is very important for
achieving the goals of the Smart Grid Network. Specifically, there are several different modelings of this problem, but the common point is the aim of balancing
consumers’ demand for electricity and determining the best plan for electricity supply and pricing from companies’ side, in order to increase and reduce companies’
profit and generation cost, respectively.
In [56] the authors study the demand response management problem in a centralized manner, by using a finite-horizon Markov decision process (MDP) and a linear
programming technique, in order to maximize companies’ profit and determine the
energy load in a real-time electricity market. On the other hand, a decentralized
approach of the demand response management problem is studied in [57], where the
authors formulate the problem of managing the demand response as a non-convex
optimization problem, where convex relaxation techniques are applied, and the companies’ optimal pricing is determined.
A different formulation of the demand response management problem is followed
in [58], where the notion of micro-grids is developed in the electricity market in order
to fulfill power demand in specific regions. The authors address the problem of demand response management by constructing a Stackelberg game with a unique equilibrium solution. The notion of micro-grids is also studied in [59], where the authors
examine the demand response management problem for multiple energy resources
(i.e., Fuel cells, PhotoVoltaic modules), and they propose a two-stage stochastic
programming approach to minimize the operational cost in energy management.
In [60], a price prediction model with the use of an Artificial Neural Network
is introduced by the authors, while the costumers adopt a Reinforcement Learning
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mechanism in order to deal with the uncertainty in the feature prices and make optimal decisions regarding their home appliances. A quite similar method, in terms of
the construction of a predictive model is followed in [61], where the customers use the
prediction control in order to manage in an autonomous manner their ON/OFF periods and determining their optimal decisions for the demand response management
problem. A neural network is also used in [62], where the authors introduce a smart
grid model that considers the power consumption and the customers’ satisfaction,
while a projection neural network is used for minimizing the electricity cost for all
the users. Furthermore, the demand response management is studied also in [63],
as the costumers utilize renewable energy resources, which are controlled by cloud
servers, and the use of current security mechanisms (i.e., RSA, AES, ECC) is studied
for security purposes.
An incentive-based demand response management optimization framework is introduced in [64], where the customers efficiently determine their optimal households’
energy consumption during peak hours, while in [65] the authors address the peak
loads in an electricity market by introducing quality of service metrics for the customers, and a data analytical management scheme. The proposed scheme is based
on the analysis of consumers’ consumption data gathered from smart homes. On the
other hand, in [66] the authors implement a heuristic demand response technique
for consumption scheduling of appliances, in order to decrease peak to average ratio
of power demand. The authors use stochastic programming, and communication
requirements, in order to schedule customers’ consumption in real time.
The authors in [67] highlight the importance of the use of auto-configured devices,
and based on that they design an adaptable energy management system, in order to
determine the customers’ demand response. The pareto optimal demand response
management based on energy costs and load factor is studied in [68], where the
authors introduce a multi-objective optimization problem and its pareto optimality
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is determined. The demand response management problem has been studied also in
the era of multiple datacenters, where in [69] the authors introduce an approach to
dynamically adjust the datacenters’ load to balance the unstable solar input into the
energy grid.
Moreover, in [70] the authors implement a large-scale optimization approach in a
distributed manner, in order to control and support the demand response of residential appliances. This scheme is based on a hierarchical control and a coordination
system, that enables the exchange of information between the utility and the management system. A hierarchical based system is also used in [71], where the authors
introduce a dynamic pricing response algorithm, that considers both the service
providers’ profit and customers’ costs. The hierarchical decision making is made
based on a Reinforcement Learning mechanism, where the Q-learning algorithm is
adopted to solve the decision making problem.
In [72] the authors examine and consider models from the market place in order
to design demand response management to match power supply and meet customers’
demands. The authors in [73] propose distributed algorithms for electricity companies and consumers, in order to maximize the social welfare. [74] presents a new
algorithm for finding the optimal time of use of electricity.
In addition, it is equally important to apply game theory for modeling the demand response management problem, as game theory is proved to be quite effective
in dealing with complex interactions. The authors in [36] formulated the problem as
a non-cooperative N-person game, and a distributed demand response management
strategy is proposed in order to achieve the minimum energy cost. Network congestion is also studied in [39] and a load management strategy modeled as a ”Smart
Network” game is proposed. The authors in [75] studied the planning of home energy
consumption through a Stackelberg game, in which the electricity companies are the
leaders of the network and the consumers adjust their demands.
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The key point of all the above research is that in smart electricity distribution
networks, there is only one company that supplies electricity to consumers. However,
as we have already pointed out, the liberalization of the electricity market now gives
consumers the option to choose between many energy providers [46], [76], [77], which
brings new challenges to the interaction between companies and consumers. It is
therefore imperative to study the problem of managing the demand response in an
environment where many electricity companies coexist. A first survey in this multicompany and multi-consumer environment is presented in [74], but the authors do
not take into account the power functions of the electricity companies.

In this work we study the problem of managing the demand response when there
are multiple electricity companies and multiple consumers in the Smart Grid Network. To fully analyze the interactions between electricity companies and customers,
demand response problem management is modeled as a two-stage game, the consumers’ stage and the companies’ stage. At the customer level, every customer
wants to maximize its utility function, which is directly dependent on the electricity price, which is expressed by appropriate fairness criteria with respect to other
consumers in the network. It is worth noting that in the proposed framework, the
non-changing demand has been treated with a different priority compared to the
changing demand. As far as the electricity companies is concerned, by considering
the required electricity consumption of the customers, that was set in the first stage,
each company determines the price that it will announce to the consumers in order
to maximize its welfare function. After the two-stage theoretical optimization framework, customers they can interact with each other and eventually strike a balance if
appropriate strategies are selected from both sides.
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Figure 2.1: Smart Grid Network

2.2

Modeling of the System

Figure 2.1 shows a graphical representation of the considered Smart Grid Network,
consisting of multiple users and multiple power companies. There is a two-way communication between companies and consumers that is achieved through a centralized
Service Provider (SP) management system. In essence, this centralized management
system acts as an intermediary connection between power companies and customers,
with which customers and companies are connected through power connection (solid
lines), while two-way communication connections (dotted lines), enable the connectivity between companies and customers. The centralized management system allows
for the exchange of information, including the power companies’ prices and customers’ load demand. Each customer is equipped with an Energy Management Controller (EMC), which coordinates the power consumption among customer’s smart
appliances and is aware of appliances’ shiftable and non-shiftable electricity demand
and consumption.
A fundamental novelty that differentiates this work from the recent relevant liter-
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ature, is that each consumer is informed through the centralized management system
about the network’s total energy consumption, and as a result each customer’s privacy is maintained. The information of the energy consumption, allows us to apply
price fairness criteria regarding the consumption price of each customer and so in the
Smart Grid Network can coexist harmonious consumers of different economic levels.
We define as J = {1, · · · , j, · · · , J} the set of electricity power companies, and
with I = {1, · · · , i, · · · , I} the set of customers that exist in the Smart Grid Network.
The whole operation time is divided in T timeslots, where T = {1, · · · , t, · · · , T }
denotes the corresponding set. Moreover, As,i , Ans,i denote the set of appliances
characterized by shiftable and non-shiftable electricity consumption of customer i, i ∈
I, respectively, while customer’s i overall set of appliances is denoted as Ai = As,i ∪
Ans,i .

2.2.1

Utility and Characteristics of Customers

The considered Smart Grid Network consists of multiple customers and power com(t)

panies. Each customer i, i ∈ I is characterized by its demand di [KW h] of electricity
units per operation timeslot t towards meeting the needs of its appliances a, a ∈ Ai .
Based on the availability of the generated electricity by the power companies and
(t)

its corresponding price, customer i consumes ei,j [KW h] amount of electricity via selecting the power company j, j ∈ J. At each operation timeslot t, each customer i is
served exclusively from one company, while the power company selection of each customer i can vary for different timeslots. In this work, we assume that the power com(t)

(t)

panies are able to cover customers’ demands, thus ei,j ≤ di , ∀i ∈ I, ∀j ∈ J, ∀t ∈ T.
(t)

We denote as xa,i the demand of customer’s i appliance a ∈ Ai for the timeslot t,
(t)

and xa,i,j the corresponding electricity consumption of customer’s i appliance a, a ∈
Ai from the j th power company. Then, the shiftable and non-shiftable electricity
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consumption of customer i in timeslot t from j th power company are determined
P (t)
P (t)
(t)
(t)
(t)
as Xs,i,j =
xa,i,j and Xns,i,j =
xa,i,j . Thus, it is concluded that ei,j =
(t)
Xs,i,j

+

a∈As,i
(t)
(t)
Xns,i,j ≤ Xs,i

a∈Ans,i

+

(t)
Xns,i

=

(t)
di ,

(t)

where Xs,i =

P
a∈As,i

(t)

(t)

xa,i and Xns,i =

(t)

P

xa,i .

a∈Ans,i

At each operation timeslot t, every customer i aims at satisfying its needs for
electricity consumption, while giving higher priority to its non-shiftable appliances’
(t)

electricity needs Xns,i . It is noted that in a competitive market, as the one assumed
here, though the customer i requests and buys electricity from a power company j,
it should also consider the total electricity consumption of the rest of the customers,
P P (t)
(t)
i.e., E−i =
ei0 ,j , in the current timeslot t, as the electricity consumption of
j∈J i0 ∈I,i0 6=i

the rest of the customers in the Smart Grid Network contributes to the configuration
of the prices announced by the power companies, as it is presented in the following
subsection. This key feature is one of the essentials elements of this work, which
differentiate it from similar research work, where each customer’s utility function
has been formulated considering only its personal electricity consumption. Each
P P (t)
customer i is informed about the total electricity consumption E (t) =
ei,j in
j∈J i∈I

the Smart Grid Network via the centralized SP and through the communication
network. As a result, each customer i is able to deduct its personal consumption
(t)

(t)

(t)

ei,j , i.e., E−i = E (t) − ei,j , and no privacy issues are related to this broadcasted
(t)

information (i.e., E (t) ) by the SP, since each customer’s consumption ei,j is hidden
with the total consumption.
Each customer’s i satisfaction function is formulated as an increasing concave
(t)

(t)

function si (ri ) with respect to the relative customer’s consumption, i.e., ri

=

(t)

ei,j

(t)

E−i

. As Figure 2.2 demonstrates, customer’s i satisfaction increases rapidly till
(t)

its relative non-shiftable consumption, i.e.,

Xns,i
(t)

E−i

, is satisfied, while after that point

its satisfaction increases slowly till it fulfils its relative shiftable electricity needs,
(t)

i.e.,

Xs,i

(t)
E−i

(t)

. Also, for values greater than its overall relative consumption, i.e.,
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Relative Consumption
Figure 2.2: Customers’ Satisfaction Function

satisfaction is saturated, because there are no other real needs to cover via consuming
additional electricity.
In this work, without loss of generality, we adopt a logarithmic customer’s satisfaction function with respect to its relative electricity consumption, as:
(t)

(t)

(t)

(t)

si (ri ) = si (ei,j , e−i ) = k · log(1 + λ · ri )

(2.1)

(t)

where e−i denotes the vector of all customers’ electricity consumption excluding
customer i, and the parameters k, λ ∈ R+ determine the slope of the concave function
to reflect its priority to fulfill its relative non-shiftable consumption prerequisities.
Furthermore, another major novelty introduced in this work, is the proposal of a
relative fair pricing policy for the customers that is applied by the power companies
that exist in the Smart Grid Network. Specifically, the power companies charge each
(t)

customer i based on its relative electricity consumption, i.e., ri

(t)

=

ei,j

(t)

E−i

, and not

(t)

based only on its overall consumption ei,j . Based on this pricing policy, the power
companies provide the incentive even to the low budget customers to buy affordable
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amount of electricity in terms of cost, thus still satisfying, while limiting the high
budget customers’ greedy behavior who aim to dominate the Smart Grid Network.
As a result, the benefits of the proposed fair pricing policy are two-fold:

1. customers are satisfied due to fair charges of electricity consumption
2. the power companies attract more customers, thus increase their profit in a
long-term period and improve their penetration in the market.

(t)

This fair pricing policy for each customer i based on its relative consumption ri , is
formulated as:
(t)

(t)

(t)

(t)

(t)

(t)

F P Pi (ri ) = F P P (ei,j , e−i ) = γi · ri · pj

(2.2)

(t)

$
where, pj [ KW
] is the price that is announced by the power company j, j ∈ J for
h
(t)

the timeslot t, t ∈ T, and γi

is a time-varying parameter capturing the dynamics
(t)

of customer’s i behavior, i.e., smaller γi

reflects customer’s i dynamic behavior to

spend money in order to buy more electricity.
Finally, each customer’s i, i ∈ I utility function is formulated via capturing its
(t)

satisfaction, i.e., si (ri ) with respect to its relative electricity consumption, as well
as its dissatisfaction due to the associated charges (i.e., pricing), as follows:
(t)

(t)

(t)

(t)

(t)

Ui (ei,j , e−i , p(t) ) = si (ri ) − F P Pi (ri )
(t)

(t)

(t)

(t)

(2.3)

= si (ei,j , e−i ) − F P Pi (ei,j , e−i )
(t)

(t)

(t)

(t)

= k · log(1 + λ · ri ) − γi · ri · pj
(t)

(t)

(t)

where p(t) = (p1 , · · · , pj , · · · , pJ ) denotes the vector of the announced prices by
the power companies in timeslot t, t ∈ T.
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2.2.2

Welfare and Characteristics of Power Companies
(t)

Each power company j, j ∈ J generates an amount gj [KW h] of electricity units
per timeslot t, while the generation cost of each electricity unit from the j th power
(t)

$
company in timeslot t is cj [ KW
]. In this work, we assume that each power comh
(t)

(t)

pany j is able to generate the overall needed amount of electricity, thus gj = Ej =
P (t)
ei,j . The peak customers’ electricity consumption in the j th power company is
i∈I
P (t)
(t)
EPj = max Ej = max ei,j , while the corresponding average consumption over T
t∈T

t∈T i∈I

(t)

P

operation timeslots in the j

th

power company is Eavgj =

t∈T

P P

Ej

T

t∈T i∈I

=

T

(t)

ei,j

. More-

over, using the peak customers’ electricity consumption EPj and the corresponding
average consumption Eavgj , we define the peak-to-average (PAR) ratio in customers’
electricity consumption of the j th power company as P ARj =

EPj
Eavgj

.

Each power company aiming to achieve a low peak-to-average ratio power consumption, so as to maintain the smooth electricity generation during the day. Also,
customers prefer to be served by companies that maintain low peak-to-average rations, as through this way they ”feel” more ”safe” that they will be satisfied effectively
and fulfil their electricity requirements.
A fairly effective way for the power companies to maintain low peak-to-average
ratio, is to provide incentives to the customers to shift their consumption from highpeak to off-peak for specific periods of the day. Moreover, the power companies
could benefited by the policy of announcing discounts to the customers, regarding
their billing prices. Through this way, it is able the electricity needs among the
customers to be balanced, and as a result the power companies to maintain low peakto-average ratio, and at the same time the announcements of discounts to provide
incentives to the customers to select the power company, which will result in a longterm improvement of the power company’s profit.
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Discount strategy is a fairly common technique with which companies manage to
win more customers and improve their profit in a long term period. The effectiveness
of this technique has already been studied in literature and has been applied in several
different fields, as in tourism. The power companies of the Smart Grid Network
by studying and analyzing the consumption habits of the customers, are able to
determine the most appropriate and effective discounts for their electricity prices.
Each power company is interested to increase its reputation and competitiveness
in the electricity market. In a nutshell, each power company’s reputation increases as
P
(t)
the total price discounts, i.e., t∈T fj , offered to the customers increases, throughout the day, as well as if the company maintains low peak-to-average ratio. In this
work, we formulate the competitiveness of each power company j, j ∈ J via its penetration to the electricity market, which is translated to the electricity consumption
served by the j th power company over the total electricity consumption in the Smart
P

Grid Network, i.e., Compj =

t∈T

(t)

P P

Ej

E (t)

=

t∈T i∈I

(t)

ei,j

P P P
j∈J t∈T i∈I

(t)

ei,j

Consequently, each power company j, j ∈ J is characterized by a reputation and
competitiveness score RCj , which is considered by the customers throughout the
power company selection process, and is formulated as follows:
RCj =

X

(t)

fj ·

t∈T
(t)

where, fj

1
· Compj
P ARj

(2.4)

is the discount that is announced by the power company j, j ∈ J to the

customers during the timeslot t, t ∈ T.
The profit of each power company is constructed by considering the revenue and
the costs of the power company by billing its customers and generating the needed
electricity, respectively. Specifically, each power company’s j, j ∈ J profit function is
formulated as follows:
(t)

(t)

(t)

(t)

(t)

(t)

(t)

(t)

Pj (Ej , pj ) = Rj (Ej , pj ) − Cj (Ej )
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(t)

(t)

where, Rj and Cj

express the revenue and the generation cost of the j th power
(t)

company, respectively. The power company’s j revenue Rj per timeslot t depends
on the amount of sold electricity to the customers that selected to be served by the
P (t)
(t)
(t)
specific company, i.e., Ej =
ei,j , the company’s price pj per electricity unit, and
i∈I

the discount

(t)
fj

that the company announces to the customers on that timeslot. As

a result, the power company’s j revenue is formulated as:
(t)

(t)

(t)

(t)

(t)

X

(t)

XX

Rj (Ej , pj ) = (1 − fj ) · pj ·

(t)

ei,j

i∈I
(t)

= (1 − fj ) · pj ·

(t)

(2.6)

xa,i,j

i∈I a∈Ai

On the other hand, the power company’s j cost for generating the overall amount
of electricity that the customers demand, is expressed as:
(t)

(t)

(t)

(t)

(t)

Cj (Ej ) = cj · Ej = cj ·

X

(t)

ei,j

(2.7)

i∈I
(t)

where cj

denotes the power company’s j electricity production cost per unit of

electricity for the timeslot t.

2.3

Modeling of the Smart Grid Network as a Distributed Learning System

Power companies build their reputation and competitiveness for a long time to attract
more customers and increase their profits. On the other hand, each company’s reputation and competitiveness factor contribute significantly on the customers’ choices
regarding the power company that they select to be served by. Consequently, the
Smart Grid Network can be studied as a learning system, where the customers act
as learning automata that interact with the environment to determine which power
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Figure 2.3: Smart Grid Network as a Learning System

company to select to be served from. Figure 2.3 presents the the Smart Grid Network as a learning system and the relationship between the learning automata and
the environment. Specifically, each customer/learning automaton at each operaP j
tion timeslot t has an action vector αi (t) = (αi1 , · · · , αij , · · · , αiJ ), where
αi = 1,
j∈J

thus the action vector αi (t) represents the customer’s i power company selection
for the timeslot t. Towards making their decision, the learning automata consider
the output set β(t) = (e(t) , p(t) ), i.e., e(t) is the vector of all customers’ electricity consumption, and p(t) the pricing vector that contains the power companies’
prices, as this is determined by solving the Demand Response Management problem,
which is analyzed in Chapter 3. The solution of the Demand Response Management problem refers to customers’ and companies’ optimal electricity consumption
and prices, respectively. Based on the learning automata chosen actions and the
corresponding reaction of the environment, the reward probability rj (t) that is associated with the power company that the customer selected to be served by, is
obtained as rj (t) =

RC
P j ,
RCj

thus 0 ≤ rj (t) ≤ 1, ∀j ∈ J. Essentially, the reward

j∈J

probability rj (t) updates with a higher or a lower probability the customer’s selection, regarding the power company j that was selected and with which its reward
probability rj (t) is associated with. The action probability vector of customer i is
defined as Pri (t) = (P ri,1 (t), · · · , P ri,j (t), · · · , P ri,J (t)), where P ri,j represents the
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probability of the customer i to select the power company j for the timeslot t. Each
customer’s i probability vector is updated based on the concept of stochastic learning
automata [78], and the update rules are formulated as follows:
RCj
· P ri,j (t), if j (t+1) 6= j (t)
P ri,j (t + 1) = P ri,j (t) − b · P
RCj

(2.8)

j∈J

RCj
P ri,j (t + 1) = P ri,j (t) + b · P
· (1 − P ri,j (t)), if j (t+1) = j (t)
RCj

(2.9)

j∈J

where 0 < b < 1 is the learning step parameter that controls the convergence and
the complexity of the learning algorithm. Essentially, Eq. 2.8 represents customer’s
selection probability update rule for the next timeslot for the company that was
selected, while Eq. 2.9 represents the update rule that is followed for the rest selection
probabilities of the customer, thus for the ones that are associated with the rest power
companies. In that way, the customer acting as a learning automaton, increases its
probability of selecting the same power company j based on the achievable reward
probability rj (t) of that company, thus the customer explores its environment and
converges to the power company that provides a good reward (i.e., reputation score).
It should be noted that initially the overall Smart Grid Network needs no prior
knowledge of the reward and action probabilities, and thus the initial power company
selection by the users can be simply assumed as P ri,j (t) = J1 , ∀j ∈ J. The customers,
in a long-term period converge to the most cost-efficient solution of power company
selection per operation timeslot t, given also that the overall policies of the power
(t)

(t)

(t)

companies (i.e., cj , pj , fj , ∀j ∈ J, ∀t ∈ T) do not change rapidly within a long
time period. Finally, it is also highlighted that other learning techniques, such as
exponential learning, Q-learning, etc., could be also adopted instead of the learning
automata approach that was selected in that work due to the scalable and lowcomplexity nature.
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Demand Response Management
Problem

3.1

Problem Formulation

The Demand Response Management (DRM) porblem is formulated considering the
iterations and interactions of both the power companies and the customers. Before
the DRM problem, the customers have already selected the power companies that
they want to served by, based on their stochastic learning methodology described in
Section 2.3. Each power company j, j ∈ J aims at maximizing its profit (i.e., Eq.
2.5), by considering the customers’ electricity consumption, and it aims to converge
(t)∗

to the optimal announced price pj

per timeslot t, t ∈ T. On the other hand, each

customer’s i, i ∈ I goal is to maximize its personal utility function (i.e., Eq. 2.3),
given the announced electricity prices by the power companies, and determine in a
(t)∗

distributed manner its optimal electricity consumption ei,j . The distributed nature
(t)∗

in determining both the optimal prices pj , ∀j ∈ J, and each customer’s optimal
(t)∗

consumption ei,j , ∀i ∈ I is a key component in the formulation and solution of
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the DRM problem in order to support the vision of independent and deregulated
electricity markets, where no centralized entity is required, as both the customers
and the power companies act as distributed decision makers.
Each power company’s j, j ∈ J, and each customer’s i, i ∈ I DRM optimization
problem, is formulated as follows:


(t)
(t) (t)
(t)
(t) (t)
(t)
(t)
Pj (Ej , pj ) = Rj (Ej , pj ) − Cj (Ej )

X (t) 
X (t)
= argmax 

(t)
(t)
(t)
ei,j
= (1 − fj ) · pj ·
ei,j − cj ·
(t)
p


(t)∗

pj

(3.1)

j

i∈I

(t)∗

ei,j

i∈I


 (t) (t) (t)
(t)
(t)
Ui (ei,j , e−i , p(t) ) = si (ri ) − F P Pi (ri )




(t) (t)
(t) (t)
= argmax  = s(t)

(e
,
e
)
−
F
P
P
(e
,
e
)
i i,j
i
i,j
−i
−i


(t)
ei,j
(t)
(t)
(t)
(t)
= k · log(1 + λri ) − γi · ri · pj

(3.2)

As Eq. 3.1 and Eq. 3.2 depict, the decisions about the optimal prices by the
power companies and the optimal electricity consumption by the customers are interconnected problems, as the decision of the one (i.e., power companies) should act
as an input to the other (i.e., customers) and vice versa. As a result, the DRM problem is studied as a two-stage game, where at the first stage, the optimal electricity
consumption of the customers is determined via formulating the maximization problem of their utilities (i.e., Eq. 3.2) as a non-cooperative game among the customers.
At the second stage, each power company, given the optimal electricity consumption of the customers, determines its optimal pricing policy that maximizes its profit
(i.e., Eq. 3.1). The interaction and feedback among power companies and customers
endure until both conclude to their optimal decisions.
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3.2

Customers’ Optimal Consumption Response

In the first stage of the DRM problem, each customer i, i ∈ I determines its optimal electricity consumption for timeslot t, t ∈ T, by considering its power company
selection and the announced price by the corresponding company. We define as
h
i
(t)
(t)
G = I, {Si }, {Ui } the non-cooperative consumption response game among the
customers, which consists of the infinite set of customers I = {1, · · · , i, ·, I}, the
(t)

(t)

(t)

strategy space Si = [0, di ] of each customer i, ∀i ∈ I and its utility function Ui .
The non-cooperative consumption response game G can be expressed as follows:


(t)
(t)
(t)
Ui = si (ri ) − F P Pi (ri )

max 
(t)
(t)
(t)
(t)
(t)
ei,j ∈Si
(3.3)
= k · log(1 + λri ) − γi · ri · pj
(t)

(t)

s.t. 0 ≤ ei,j ≤ di

The commonly used concept in solving game-theoretic problems is the Nash Equilibrium (NE) at which no customer can improve its utility by unilaterally changing
its electricity consumption.
(t)∗

Definition 1 An electricity consumption vector e(t)∗ = (e

(t)∗

(t)

1,ch1

,··· ,e

(t)

I,chI

), where

(t)

chi is the customer’s i selected power company, is the NE point for the game G, if
(t)

(t)∗

(t)∗

(t)

(t)

(t)∗

(t)

(t)

and only if Ui (ei,j , e−i ) ≥ Ui (ei,j , e−i ), ∀ei,j ≤ di .
Towards proving the existence and uniqueness of the NE of the non-cooperative
game G, it suffices to show that for every timeslot t, t ∈ T, each customer’s i strategy
(t)

space Si is a non-empty, convex and compact subset of the Euclidean space RI , and
(t)

(t)

(t)

(t)

(t)

(t)

the utility function Ui (ei,j , e−i , pj ) is continuous in ei,j and quasi-concave in Si
as explained in [14].

Theorem 1 In the non-cooperative consumption response game G, customer’s i best
(t)

(t)

(t)∗

response strategy to a given electricity consumption vector e−i is BRi (e−i ) = ei,j ,
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0

as provided in Eq. 3.4, where si−1 is the inverse function of the first derivative of
0

the customer’s i satisfaction function si , and τ = limr(t) →∞ si−1
i

(t)

(t)∗

BRi (e−i ) = ei,j


(t)
(t)
(t)


di
if 0 ≤ γi · pj ≤ τ



0 −1
0 −1
(t)
(t)
(t)
(3.4)
= min{d(t)
,
E
·
s
(0)}
if
τ
<
γ
·
p
≤
s
i
−i
i
i
j
i (0)




0
(t)
(t)
0
if γi · pj > si−1 (0)

Proof See Appendix A
Based on Theorem 1 that determines each customer’s i, i ∈ I best responses
(t)

(t)

strategy BRi (e−i ) = ei,j and considering the quasi-concavity property with respect
(t)

(t)

to ri of customer’s utility function Ui , the existence and uniqueness of the NE of
the non-cooperative game G is derived as follows.
Theorem 2 The Nash Equilibrium of the non-cooperative consumption response
game G exists and is unique.
Proof : The NE is by definition the fixed point in the best response function set
(t)∗

(t)

(t)

(t)

that satisfies ei,j = BRi (e−i ). In the two cases, where 0 ≤ γi · pj
(t)

(t)

γi · pj

≤ τ and

0

> si (0), the fixed point of the best response function set is unique, i.e.,
(t)∗

(t)

(t)∗

maximum electricity consumption, i.e., ei,j = di or no consumption, i.e., ei,j = 0,
(t)

(t)

0

respectively. In the third case, where τ < γi · pj ≤ si (0), the uniqueness of the
NE point can be proved via adopting the concept of standard function [14], [79]. A
function f (x) is characterized as standard if it satisfies the following properties [9]:

1. Positivity: f (x) > 0
2. Monotonicity: if x ≥ x0 , then f (x) > f (x0 )
3. Scalability: ∀a > 1, a · f (x) ≥ f (a · x)
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If a fixed point exists in a standard function, then it is unique [14], [79]. As it
(t)∗

(t)

(t) (t)

0

is shown in [9], ei,j = BRi (e−i ) for τ < γi pj ≤ si (0) (i.e., Eq. 3.4) can easily be
(t)

(t)

0

shown that it is a standard function. Thus, in the case that τ < γi · pj ≤ si (0) the
NE exists and is unique.
Finally, as we have already mentioned, the customers’ optimal electricity consumption, as this is determined in Eq. 3.4 will act as input to the optimal pricing
problem, where each power company determines the optimal price.

3.3

Companies’ Optimal Pricing Response

In the first stage of the DRM optimization problem, the optimal electricity of each
customer was determined, while in the second stage each power company aims to
maximize its profit (i.e., Eq. 2.5) in a distributed manner, via calculating the optimal
price to be announced. Combining Eq. 3.1, 3.4, the optimal pricing problem based
on customers’ optimal consumption response can written as follows [18].

(t)∗

pj



(t)
(t)
(t) (t)
(t)
(t)
Pj = Rj (Ej , pj ) − Cj (Ej )

"
#


X

k
1 
(t)
(t)
(t)
 = (1 − fj ) · pj ·
E−i · ( (t) (t) − ) 
λ 
= argmax 
γi pj


i∈I
(t)


"
#
pj


X
1
k


(t)
(t)
− cj
E−i ( (t) (t) − )
λ
γi pj
i∈I

(3.5)

The optimal pricing problem in response to customers’ consumption, as it is
rewritten in Eq. 3.5, is a function only of power company’s price.

Theorem 3 Each power company’s j, j ∈ J optimal price that maximizes its profit,
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given customers’ optimal response consumption, is given as:

(t)∗
pj


=


k·λ·

(t)
cj

(t)

·

P
i∈I

(t)

(1 − fj ) ·

P

E−i
γi (t)

 12



(t) 

(3.6)

E−i

i∈I

Proof See Appendix B
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Power Company Selection &
Demand Response Management
Algorithm

4.1

Distributed Learning Algorithm PC-DRM

A two-stage Power Company learning selection and Demand Response Management
(PC-DRM) algorithm is proposed in this section that realizes the overall aforementioned framework. In the first part of the algorithm, the stochastic learning automata
methodology, is included, where each customer i, i ∈ I based on its selection proba(t)

bility vector Pri , determines the power company that will be served by. It is noted
that the power company selection part runs once at the beginning of each timeslot
t, t ∈ T. After the power company selection of the customers, the second part of
the PC-DRM algorithm, implements the DRM optimization problem (i.e., Chapter
3), where each customer’s optimal consumption response and each power company’s
optimal price, are determined. The DRM part of the PC-DRM algorithm, runs at
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every timeslot for several iterations until the two-stage game theoretic problem to
converge on its NE point, where neither of the customer has the incentive to change
its electricity consumption, and as a result the power companies hold their optimal
announced prices.

4.1.1

PC-DRM Algorithm

In this section, each step of the PC-DRM algorithm is presented and analyzed, and
its pseudo code is presented as well. The steps of the PC-DRM algorithm can be
summarized as follows:
1. Initialization Phase: At the beginning of the first timeslot, (i.e., t = 0),
each customer i, i ∈ I initializes its probability vector by following a normal
(0)

distribution, thus P ri,j =

1
,
J

∀i ∈ J, ∀j ∈ J. Consequently, each customer
(0)

chooses a power company according to its initial probability vector Pri .
2. Power Company Selection - PC: At every other timeslot t, t ∈ T, such
that t > 0 each customer i, i ∈ I chooses a power company to be served
(t)

from, according to its probability vector Pri . If ∀i ∈ I, ∃j, j ∈ J such that
(t)

P ri,j → 1, then stop. Otherwise, ite = ite + 1, where ite denotes the iteration
of the DRM part of the algorithm.
3. Customers’ Optimal Consumption Response: Given that all the customers have selected their company that they will be served from, the power
companies announce their prices and the total electricity consumption (i.e.,
E (t) ) in the Smart Grid Network. Each customer i, i ∈ I determines its opti(t)

mal consumption response based on Eq. 3.4, as ei,j |ite
4. Companies’ Optimal Pricing Response: Given customers’ optimal electricity consumption. each power company determines its optimal prices based
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(t)∗

on Eq. 3.5, as pj |ite
(t)∗

(t)∗

(t)∗

5. Checking for Convergence: if |ei,j |ite+1 − ei,j |ite | → 0 and |pi,j |ite −
(t)∗

pi,j |ite+1 | → 0, ∀i ∈ I, ∀j ∈ J, then the two-stage non-cooperative game has
converged to its NE point. Otherwise go to Step 3.
6. Stochastic Learning Automata: Each power company j, j ∈ J determines
(t)

its reward probability rj , and it is broadcasted to the customers. Each customer i, i ∈ I updates its probability vector Prti based on Eq. 2.8 and 2.9.
Return to Step 2.

The PC-DRM learning distributed algorithm can be summarized as follows:
Algorithm 1 PC-DRM Algorithm
(0)
1
1: Input/Initialization: I, J, di(t) , γi(t) , c(t)
j , P ri,j = J ∀i ∈ I, ∀j ∈ J, ∀t ∈ T
(t)∗
(t)∗
(t)∗
(t)∗
(t)∗
2: Output: NE point e = (e1 , · · · , eI ), p = (p(t)∗
, · · · , pJ ) ∀t ∈ T
1
3: for each timeslot t, t ∈ T do
4: Ite = 0, Convergence = 0
5: Each customer i, i ∈ I selects a power company based on Pr(t)
i
6: while not Convergence do
7:
Ite = Ite + 1
8:
for i = 1 to I do
(t)∗
9:
Customer i determines its ei,j based on Eq. 3.4
10:
end for
11:
for j = 1 to J do
(t)∗
12:
Power Company j determines its optimal price pj
based on Eq. 3.5
13:
end for
(t)∗
(t)∗
14:
if (Ite > 0 && |ei |ite − e(t)∗ |ite−1 | → 0 && |pj |ite − p(t)∗ |ite−1 | → 0, ∀i ∈ I, ∀j ∈ J) then
15:
Convergence = 1
16:
end if
17: end while
18: end for

The PC-DRM distributed algorithm can be characterized as a low complexity
algorithm (as it is also confirmed by the numerical results in Chapter 5), due to the
constant in terms of complexity operations that are made both in the customers’ and

32

Chapter 4. Power Company Selection & Demand Response Management Algorithm

companies’ side. Furthermore, due to its low complexity the PC-DRM algorithm can
be installed and realized through the customers’ smart meters in a real-time manner,
while from the companies’ point of view, the proposed algorithm can run at the
companies’ management and decision-making center. Finally, in Section [Results] it is
shown that the action customers’ selection probabilities converge fast, something that
indicates and confirm the efficiency of the stochastic learning automata methodology,
that we propose on this work.
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Chapter 5
Experiments and Numerical
Evaluation

5.1

Experiment Setup

In this chapter, a detailed numerical performance evaluation and comparative study
of the proposed framework is conducted through modeling and simulations. The results illustrate the operation, features and benefits of the proposed demand response
management framework. These simulations were generated utilizing the programming suite MATLAB. Initially, in Section 5.2, we focus on the operation performance of our framework, in terms of the obtained optimal customers’ consumption
responses and companies’ prices. Moreover, the distribution of the customers to the
available companies in the Smart Grid Network is studied, and the corresponding
power companies’ profit values are presented. Furthermore, the operation and the
convergence of the distributed learning algorithm (i.e., stochastic learning automata)
is illustrated, while the Demand and Response Management optimization problem
to its stable solution, is presented as well. In addition, in Section 5.3, a detailed
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comparative evaluation of our approach against other alternative approaches is provided, and the differences with respect to the achieved customers’ and companies’
satisfaction, and customers’ electricity energy consumption, are discussed.
On our base experimental scenario, we considered a Smart Grid Network consisting of J = 5 power companies, and I = 100 customers. Also, we considered k = 1000,
(t)

λ = 100 and as a learning step b = 0.6, while the γi parameter of each customer is
randomly generated. Each company has constant characteristics throughout the day
(t)

(t)

(i.e, generation cost cj , and discount policy fj ), while the corresponding values
that were used are:

1. f = {.0285, .027, .029, 0.3, .028}
2. c = {.255, .245, .265, .285, .265}

5.2

Operation of the PC-DRM Algorithm

At first, we focus on the power companies’ selection process, via adopting the proposed distributed learning framework (i.e., Section 2.3). Each power company j, j ∈ J
aims to improve its market profile by achieving a low peak to average ratio (i.e.,
P ARj ) and a high competitiveness (i.e., Compj ). As we mentioned before, the low
P ARj factor indicates that the power company j balances the customers’ electricity
consumption over the time via avoiding great consumption peaks, which may not be
able to support. On the other hand, the high competitiveness factor Compj of the
power company expresses the company’s penetration in the market, in terms of the
customers’ portion that it serves.
Specifically, Fig. 5.1 and Fig. 5.2 present each power company’s j, j ∈ J peak to
average ratio P ARj and competitiveness factor Compj as a function of the PC-DRM
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algorithm’s timeslots until the convergence of the distributed learning mechanism.
Based on the considered configuration of this experimental setup, it is observed
that the power companies 1 and 5 maintain the lowest P AR and competitiveness
factor Comp. Moreover, it is noted that both the P AR and Comp factors are
determined by the solution of the DRM optimization problem, via the customers’
optimal consumption to which the two-stage game theoretic part converges at each

Peak To Average Ratio
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Figure 5.1: Peak to Average Ratio
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Figure 5.2: Competitiveness Factor

Furthermore, Fig. 5.3 depicts each company’s j reputation and competitiveness
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factor RCj , (i.e., Eq. 2.4) as a function of the PC-DRM algorithm’s timeslots. The
results illustrate that the power companies 1 and 5 build a higher reputation and
competitiveness factor RC in the market, compared to the rest, since they both
achieve a lower P AR (i.e., Fig. 5.1) and a higher competitiveness factors (i.e.,
Fig. 5.2). Consequently, these two power companies create a better profile in the
market, and the customers by learning and adapting their selection via the stochastic
learning automata methodology, they have a higher average selection probability for
these two companies (i.e., Fig. 5.4, and these two companies attract a higher portion
of customers (i.e., Fig. 5.5 over the timeslots. Specifically, as Fig. 5.5 demonstrates,
these two companies serve almost 90% of the market’s customers, with company
1 absorbing almost 70%, as it achieves the highest reputation and competitiveness
score, (i.e., Fig. 5.3), while company 5 with the second best profile in the market
serves approximately 20% of the market’s customers.
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Figure 5.3: Reputation and Competitiveness Factor

Considering the DRM optimization problem, which in this work is studied via
adopting a two-stage non-cooperative game theoretic solution (i.e., Section 3), Fig.
5.6 presents two indicative customers’ optimal energy consumption as a function
PC-DRM algorithm’s timeslots until its convergence to the stable customers’ association to the power companies. As the customers converge to their stable power

37

Average Action Probability

Chapter 5. Experiments and Numerical Evaluation

0.8
Company 1
Company 2
Company 3
Company 4
Company 5

0.6
0.4
0.2
0
0

50

100

150

200

Timeslots

Number of Users
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company selection, while at the same time they determine their optimal electricity
(t)∗

consumption (i.e., ei,j - Eq. 3.2) for each timeslot by converging to the NE point of
the non-cooperative game, their optimal electricity consumption converges to feasible values, while fulfilling their non-shiftable electricity needs (i.e., Min-consumption
curves), as a higher priority is given to them, while at the same time the customers
(t)∗

(t)

do not over-consume electricity, thus ei,j ≤ di , ∀t ∈ T. Moreover, as Fig. 5.6 illustrates, both of the presented customers consume a higher level of electricity than
their non-shiftable demands, which confirms that the proposed framework achieves
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to satisfy both the non-shiftable and a portion of the shiftable electricity needs of
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the market’s customers.
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Figure 5.6: Optimal Customers’ Electricity Consumption

Additionally, Fig. 5.7 and Fig. 5.8 depict the power companies’ prices and profit
values’ convergence, as a function of PC-DRM algorithms’ timeslots, respectively.
It is noted that Fig. 5.7 refers to indicative prices units per unit of electricity consumption (e.g.,

$
).
KW h

Based on Fig. 5.6, 5.7, and 5.8, it is concluded that the DRM

optimization problem converges to its final NE point, as the association between customers and power companies converges to its stable case, where both the customers
and the power companies maximize their utilities and profits, leading them to low
feasible low energy consumption and pricing policies, respectively. Moreover, it is
worth to be noted, that company 5, which absorbs the second highest portion of the
markets’ customers, is not the company with the second lowest price in the market
(i.e., company 3 has a lower prices), which indicates that the announcement of a
lower price by a company does not guarantee the absorbing of a higher portion of
customers, as the customers select their power companies based on their market’s
profiles (i.e., reputation and competitiveness score), which depict the overall power
companies’ behavior in the market through the timeslots. In addition, as Fig. 5.7
illustrates, the companies 1 and 5 due to their higher reputation and competitive-
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ness score (i.e., Fig. 5.3) converge to higher profit values compared to the rest power
companies, as this concludes to improved customers’ preference to be served by these
companies as we mentioned in Fig.5.5. Finally, the power company 2 has not been
selected by any customer (Fig. 5.5) in the scenario under consideration, and therefore
it’s announced price is zero and it is not present in Fig. 5.7.
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Figure 5.7: Companies’ Optimal Announced Prices
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Figure 5.8: Companies’ Achievable Profit
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5.3

Comparative Analysis

In this section, we provide a detailed comparative evaluation study of the proposed
PC-DRM framework against other approaches either from the recent literature or
different implementation alternatives, highlighting the benefits of the PC-DRM algorithm in terms of customers’ energy consumption and satisfaction. It is noted that for
fairness and completeness purposes in the comparison, the power companies’ profit
values as well as the convergence time of the different frameworks are also evaluated
and discussed.
Specifically, we evaluate the proposed PC-DRM framework against to five different approaches:

1. The demand response management algorithm (referred to as Evo) as proposed
in [37], where the association of the customers to power companies is modeled as
an evolutionary game and the customers form a population which is associated
to only one company, as outcome of the evolutionary game.
2. An alternative variation of the proposed PC-DRM algorithm-referred as MLdc,
where the customers update their selection probabilities (i.e., Eq. 2.8, 2.9)
(t)

by using the reward probability rj

(t)

=

fj

(t)

cj

, in order to capture the profile

of each power company j, j ∈ J, in terms of its announced discounts and
costs of the electricity generation. As a result, the customers select a power
company based only on monetary-related power companies’ characteristics (i.e.,
(t)

(t)

discount fj , and production cost cj ), without considering the electricityrelated characteristics of each power company, i.e., peak to average ratio P ARj
and competitiveness factor Compj . The DRM optimization problem is solved
based on the DRM part of the PC-DRM algorithm.
3. A variation of the PC-DRM algorithm - referred as MLlp, by using as a reward
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(t)

probability the rj =

1
(t)∗ ,
exp pj

which is based on the power company’s j, j ∈ J

(t)∗

optimal price pj . Specifically, the MLlp approach proposes to the customers
as the best power company choice, the one with the lowest price.
4. The Random algorithm, where each customer is associated randomly to a power
(t)

company, as each customer maintains an equal probability P ri,j =

1
J

of select-

ing each power company. The companies’ prices and customers’ consumed
electricity are determined based on the DRM optimization part (i.e., the noncooperative game) of the PC-DRM framework.
5. The best discount and cost - referred to as Bdc algorithm, which associates all
(t)

the customers with the power company j, j ∈ J that maintains the best

fj

(t)
cj

factor and the DRM optimization problem is also solved based on DRM part
of the proposed PC-DRM framework.
Figures 5.9, and 5.10 depict customers’ perceived average utility and optimal
energy consumption, respectively, as a function of the number of timeslots that all
the comparative frameworks need in order to converge to stable customers’ association to the power companies. As it is shown, the proposed PC-DRM algorithm
achieves the highest customers’ utilities (i.e., Fig. 5.9), and among the lowest customers’ electricity consumption (i.e., Fig. 5.10). This trend stems from the holistic
consideration of the power companies’ characteristics, i.e., both the monetary and
the electricity related characteristics, as these are captured by the reputation and
competitiveness factor Eq. 2.4. Moreover, the MLdc variation of the PC-DRM algorithm, which considers only the power companies’ monetary-related characteristics
in order to perform the customers’ association with the power companies, achieves
similar customers’ utilities and electricity consumption, showing the significance of
the monetary factors. This happens mainly because the monetary factors contribute
in the optimal power companies’ pricing policy (Eq. 3.1) and customers’ consumption response (Eq. 3.2), thus they affect the power companies’ electricity-related
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factors (i.e., PAR, Comp). As a result, our proposed framework consists a more
general and holistic approach compared to MLdc, by avoiding possible high peaks
of consumption in the case where power companies aim to attract the customers by
high discounts in short-term periods, thus the sufficient satisfaction of the customers’
is guaranteed by the PC-DRM approach in a long-term period.
On the other hand, the approached that do not provide the opportunity to the
customers to learn from their past decisions (i.e., Bdc, Random approaches) achieve
the lowest customers’ utility and high electricity consumption. Specifically, each
customer select its power company on a single time, by not exploring the Smart Grid
Network environment for better choices. Furthermore, the Evo [37] algorithm, which
is based on the outcome of an evolutionary game theoretic approach, associates all
the customers to only one power company, leading in that way into a monopoly
scenario where the customers achieve significantly lower average utility, while at the
same time their electricity consumption increases. Finally, the MLlp algorithm lead
the customers to select the power company with the lowest price, thus they tend
to consume more electricity, which creates a domino effect, as the customers’ cost
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Scenarios

Profit
C1
C2
C3
PC-DRM 2338
0
273
MLdc
951 837 1004
MLlp
840 1323 784
Evo
0
4392
0
Random 479 1380 759
Bdc
4208
0
0

C4
151
349
457
0
793
0

C5
756
374
974
0
848
0

Avg. Profit

T(sec)

704
703
876
878
852
842

1.01
4.86
0.43
0.65
0.04
0.05

Table 5.1: Power companies’ welfare and algorithms’ convergence time

Table 5.1 includes in a comparative manner, the achieved power companies’ profit
values, the average profit, and the actual convergence time (in seconds) for all the
comparative approaches. As it is shown, the PC-DRM and MLdc algorithms present
similar companies’ average profit values, while the PC-DRM proposed framework
presents significantly lower complexity be achieving almost a five-fold reduction in
convergence time. This is observed, since in an open electricity market, where the
power companies have similar monetary-related characteristics (i.e., production cost,
discounts), the customers may flip among the companies, thus the MLdc approach
has a delayed convergence. The more holistic approach of the PC-DRM algorithm,
where electricity-related characteristics are also considered, contributes to customers’
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faster decision-making in selecting the most appropriate company for receiving service from. The Random and Bdc algorithms, which allow the customers to make a
single time power company selection have the lowest convergence time compared to
all the other approaches. As we already mentioned, the last two algorithms present
quite poor performance in terms of customers’ utility and electricity consumption.
Finally, both Evo and MLlp approaches achieve similar results in terms of companies’
profit values and convergence time.
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Conclusion & Future Work

In this thesis, the joint problem of power company selection and demand response
management in a competitive open electricity market of a Smart Grid Network,
consisting of multiple power companies and multiple customers is studied. Initially,
a low complexity distributed learning approach is proposed, where the customers
acting as learning automata explore the environment (i.e., market) and select a
power company to be served from in an autonomous manner. Then, the demand
response management problem - DRM, is formulated as two-stage non-cooperative,
where at the first stage the customers determine their optimal electricity consumption
that maximizes their perceived utility and a stable point (i.e., Nash Equilibrium) is
achieved, while at the second stage each power company determines its optimal
pricing policy that maximizes its profit. Moreover, a distributed iterative and low
complexity algorithm is introduced to jointly implement the power company selection
and the demand response management processes.
A detailed performance evaluation of the proposed approach was conducted via
modeling and simulation, and the presented results confirmed the superiority of the
proposed PC-DRM framework, in terms of the achieved customers’ and companies’
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satisfaction, customers’ energy consumption, and implementation complexity. Nevertheless, it is noted that in this work customers’ subjectivity and individuality in
accordance with their behavioral patterns have not been considered and could be a
topic of high research and practical importance. Consequently, based on the proposed framework, it is of high interest to extend this work via studying and proposing
customers’ Quality of Experience functions, which quantify customers’ behavioral
patterns based on relative frameworks, including Prospect Theory and the tragedy
of the commons [80–83]. Finally, it is among our current and future research goals
to study how the dynamic change of customers’ behavior can influence the stability
of the open market.
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Appendix A
Proof of Theorem 1
(t)

(t)∗

Towards determining customer’s best response strategy BRi (e−i ) = ei,j , the first
(t)

and the second order derivatives of customer’s utility function Ui

with respect to

(t)

ei,j are used.
(t)

(t)

(t)

(t)

∂Ui (ei,j , e−i , pj )
(t)

=

∂ei,j
(t)

(t)

·

E−i
(t)

(t)

1

(t)

∂ 2 Ui (ei,j , e−i , pj )
(t)2
∂ei,j

=

h

0

(t)
si (ri )

1
(t)
(E−i )2

00

−

(t)
γi

·

(t)
pj

i

(A.1)

(t)

· si (ri )

(A.2)

(t)

(t)

As stated in Section 2.2.1, customer’s satisfaction function si (ri ) is an increas(t)

00

(t)

ing concave function with respect to ri , thus si (ri ) < 0 and
0

0

(t) (t) (t) (t)
∂ 2 Ui (ei,j ,e−i ,pj )
(t)2
∂ei,j

< 0.

(t)

We set τ = limr(t) →∞ si−1 . Since si (ri ) is a strictly decreasing function (due to
i

00

(t)

0

(t)

0

(t)

(t)

(t)

0

0

si (ri ) < 0) and as si (ri ) > 0, we know that τ < si (ri ) ≤ si (0) and 0 ≤ τ < si (0).
(t)

(t)

Hence, for 0 ≤ γi · pj

(t)

≤ τ , we have

(t)

∂Ui (ei,j ,e−i ,pj )
(t)
∂ei,j

(t)

> 0 and thus Ui

is an

(t)

increasing function of ei,j . In this case, the best response strategy for customer
(t)

i, i ∈ I is to demand its maximum electricity consumption, i.e., di . So, for 0 ≤
(t)

(t)

(t)

(t)

(t)

(t)

0

γi · pj ≤ τ , we have BRi (e−i ) = di , ∀i ∈ I. For τ < γi · pj ≤ si (0), the equation
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(t)

(t)

(t)

(t)

∂Ui (ei,j ,e−i ,pj )
(t)
∂ei,j
0

(t)

0

(t)

(t)

0

(t)

(t)

(t)

= 0 is equivalent to si (ri ) = γi · pj ⇔ r̂i = si−1 (γi · pj ), ∀i ∈ I.
0

(t)

Note that as si (ri ) is a strictly decreasing function, its inverse (i.e., si−1 ) exists, and
(t)

(t)

(t)

00

(t)

(t)

that r̂i is a decreasing function of γi · pj . Since si (ri ) < 0 for all ri and hence
(t)

(t)

(t)

(t)

(t)

∂ 2 Ui (ei,j ,e−i ,pj )
(t)2
∂ei,j

< 0, the roots of

(t)

(t)

(t)

∂Ui (ei,j ,e−i ,pj )
(t)

∂ei,j

(t)

(t)

(t)

(t)

= 0 maximize Ui (ei,j , e−i , pj ) for
(t)

the given electricity consumption of the rest users, i.e., e−i . An one-to-one rela(t)

(t)

tion exists between ri and ei,j , and thus the best response electricity consumption
(t)

(t)

(t)

(t)

(t)

in response to e−i that maximizes Ui (ei,j , e−i , pj ) is also unique and is equal to
(t)

(t)∗

(t)

(t)

0

(t)

(t)∗

(t)

(t)

ei,j = E−i ·r̂i = E−i si−1 (ai ·pj ). If ei,j > di customer i, i ∈ I does not request for
(t)∗

(t)∗

(t)

(t)

ei,j . In this case, since ei,j is the unique maximizer of Ui , then Ui is an increasing
(t)

(t)

(t)

(t)

(t)∗

(t)

function of ei,j in ei,j ≤ di ≤ ei,j for fixed e−i . Therefore, the best response to e−i
(t)

(t)

is the maximum value of customer’s electricity consumption, i.e., BRi (e−i ) = di .
(t)

(t)

(t)

0

(t)

(t)

0

(t)

(t)

This implies that for τ < γi · pj ≤ si (0), BRi (e−i ) = min{di , E−i · si−1 (γi · pj )}.
(t)

(t)

(t)

0

For γi · pj > si (0), we have

∂Ui

(t)

∂ei,j

(t)

< 0, thus Ui

(t)

is a decreasing function of ei,j .

In this case, the imposed price by the companies is extremely high for customers to
(t)

afford it, thus BRi (e−i ) = 0, ∀i ∈ I.
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Proof of Theorem 3

Given customers’ optimal consumption response that is determined in the first stage
of the DRM optimization problem, the profit function of each power company j, j ∈ J
is written as follows:
"
(t)

(t)

(t)

(t)

(t)

Pj (Ej , pj ) = (1 − fj ) · pj ·

X

(t)

E−i (

i∈I

"
(t)

− cj ·

X

k

(t)

E−i (

i∈I

(t)

(t)

γi · pj

(t)

Considering the first order derivative of Pj
(t)

(t)

(t)

∂Pj (E−i , pj )
(t)

∂pj

k
(t)

(t)

γi · pj
#
1
− )
λ

#
1
− )
λ
(B.1)

(t)

with respect to pj , we have:

(t)
X E−i
X (t) c(t)
1
j ·k
(t)
= − (1 − fj ) ·
E−i + (t)2 ·
(t)
λ
pj
i∈I
i∈I γi

(t)

(t)

(B.2)

(t)

As a result, the critical points of the profit function Pj (E−i , pj ) are as follows:
(t) 
P E−i
k·λ·
·
(t)
γ

i∈I i 

=
P (t) 
(t)

(1 − fj ) · E−i



(t)∗

pj

(t)
cj

(B.3)

i∈I
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(t)

The second order derivative of the profit function Pj
(t)

(t)

(t)

∂ 2 Pj (E−i , pj )
(t)2

∂pj

(t)

= −2 · cj ·

k
(t)3

pj

·

is given as follows:

(t)
X E−i

(B.4)

(t)

i∈I

γi

(t)

As observed by Eq. B.4, it holds true that

(t)

(t)

∂ 2 Pj (E−i ,pj )
(t)2
∂pj

(t)∗

< 0, thus the pj
(t)

determined in Eq. B.3 maximizes the company’s j, j ∈ J profit function Pj .
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